RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 9

Number 2

Article 9

March 1998

Review of: Erin Dominique Williams & Leo van der Reis, Health
Care at the Abyss: Managed Care vs. The Goals of Medicine
(1997)
Michael Boggs

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons

Repository Citation
Michael Boggs , Review of: Erin Dominique Williams & Leo van der Reis, Health Care at the Abyss:
Managed Care vs. The Goals of Medicine (1997), 9 RISK 197 (1998).

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce
School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK:
Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.

Book Review
Erin Dominique Williams & Leo van der Reis, Health Care at the
Abyss: Managed Care vs. The Goals of Medicine (William S. Hein

1997). About the authors, acknowledgments, figures, index, preface, references, table
of abbreviations. ISBN 1-57588-201-9 [242 pp. Paper.]
Health care reform is shifting decision-making toward a dynamic
of shared responsibility. Four major groups are involved: individuals,
underwriters, payers and providers. Business, government, the health
care industry, and participants all agree that the ultimate issues posed
by health care reform are access, cost and quality.
Yet, the authors' underlying perspective seem to be that of
physicians, and its premise that medical providers should build
consensus to regain control of health care and return economic
incentives to physicians. The title "Managed Care vs. the Goals of
Medicine" goes far toward depicting this adversarial theme.
At the outset, the authors identify eleven goals: (1) access, (2)
affordability (3) appropriateness of care, (4) comfortable providerparticipant relationships; (5) efficient administration; (6) a user-friendly
system; (7) appropriate resource distribution; (8) responsiveness to
technological growth; (9) participant privacy and confidentiality; (10)
appropriate incentives; and (11) group consensus building.
They then provide a useful basic primer of managed care models
and definitions. The authors briefly compare and contrast various types
of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), including staff,
network, group, and direct contract models; Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs); Individual Practice Associations (IPAs);
Physician-Hospital Organizations (PHOs) and Medical Savings
Accounts (MSAs). Using the eleven "goals of medicine" as an evaluation
model, various managed care models are critiqued with regard to each.
Cursory overview of these models concludes with an assessment
that managed care may increase access but do not enhance progress
toward the other goals of medicine. The exception in the authors' view
is the IPA, the one model predominantly under physician control.
The authors state that their "mission is to facilitate.., ready access
to a system of high-quality medical care for all Americans." While most
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of their eleven goals fall within the access-cost-quality paradigm, their
mission statement conspicuously avoids cost. To understand this and
the basic premise of this book, the conclusions asserted must be
analyzed with regard to the authors' perspective, economic motivation,
desire for control, and aim of group consensus building.
This book asserts that managed care ogranizations (MCOs) do not
give participants what they expect from their health care system.
However, the authors seem to presume that their expectations are
shared by participants. This is not often true. Providers traditionally
operate from an illness model, focusing on participants during the more
resource-intensive period. Participants' goals have become more focused
on preventing illness and making cost-conscious care decisions.
Problems purported to be related to MCOs is supported with a few
media anecdotes of medical complications. Although longitudinal
research is limited, MCOs appear to have more positive effects on
health outcomes than a fee-for-service, illness-oriented system. Yet, the
authors consistently conclude what they perceive to be weaknesses in
MCO models without acknowledging advancements made over similar
weaknesses that existed in the previous physician-dominated system.
Two of the eleven goals of medicine, resource distribution and
incentives, involve economic motivation. The authors admit that the
primary incentive for providers is financial. It is claimed that MCOs
provide the wrong incentives, i.e., none for physicians to provide, e.g.,
lab tests, more frequent office visits or specialist referrals. Such an
assumption is misplaced because the focus under managed care is on
increased access and decreased cost. Incentive is not related to how
much physicians can bill participants, but to the market share of MCOs
and participants that providers can win competitively.
The authors believe that appropriate incentives are those which
reward providers for delivering maximum (the most) care, not
necessarily optimal (efficient, cost-avoiding, risk-assuming) care. They
state that "[aln increase in physician compensation may facilitate access
to care." However, since prices are market-sensitive, in a fee-for-service
type system without competition, costs (and thus resources) cannot be
managed effectively. Contrary to the authors' conclusion, managed
care has decreased the cost of health care. The rate of growth of health
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care as a percentage of the gross domestic product has decreased due to
the "deregulation" resulting from competition.
The authors argue that cost-containment is inconsistent with quality
care. Yet, MCOs work to achieve fiscal goals as well as differentiate
between providers in terms of quality. Providers ability to participate in
revenue decision-making depends on how well they, e.g., understand
costs and use a management model that reducies treatment variations.
A focus on financial incentives shows a desire for control of health
care. The authors demonstrate their view of competition by asserting
that MCOs, described as "holders of the purse strings," play providers
against each other, frequently to divide and conquer physicians (and
hospitals), gaining effective control over both. They further claim that
under managed care a decreasing number of "provider positions" may
undermine appropriate care. Advocating physicians to exert more
control fails to recognize that other groups of providers, e.g., physical
therapists, nurse practitioners, psychologists and dieticians deliver
"appropriate" care. Other providers using medical management tools,
also help to assure reliable health care quality.
Arguing that financially based control of medical decision-making
can be detrimental to quality medical practice posits the underlying
premise of the book: physicians desire control of the health care system.
To rally support for this position, the authors suggest that "if all of the
groups have an opportunity to affect the delivery of health care, the
system should naturally begin to support the other goals of medicine as
well." In the context of the book's theme, this conclusion means that if
physicians had more control of the health care system, physicians' goals
would gain more support.
The authors continue to encourage group consensus-building
among provider stakeholders (coalitions among physicians to oppose
MCOs) because "providers are disenfranchised" by highly organized
MCOs. They state that group consensus-building is about "leveling the
playing field" between providers and holders of the purse strings. This
approach would fall short of the kind of consensus necessary to achieve
real health care access, cost, and quality goals because all stakeholders
are not considered. The group consensus building goal omits three of
the four major groups: insurance companies and MCOs; business and
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industry; and participants. The authors contend that "[d]iscordant
forces are currently battling each other at the expense of patients." They
state that the goal of group consensus is likely unobtainable because
interests of providers and payers are adverse. To clearly mark their
position, the authors assert that "[tihe elimination of the third party
payer [MCOs] is a sine qua non for genuine health care reform...."
Finally, the authors propose the "Quincy Model for the Delivery of
Health Care" as their formulation of a strategy to achieve the goals of
medicine. 1 This model envisions creation of the "American Health
Care Trust" (AHCT), an autonomous public corporation which would
provide: (1) universal access, voluntary participation; (2) funding
through payroll and income taxes; (3) a standardized national
computer network for billing/reimbursement management, quality
control, health care technical support, and epidemiological research; (4)
choice of provider; (5) physician salaries augmented with bonuses; (6)
medical education completely funded in exchange for service payback
in needed areas; (7) full funding of participating hospitals by a
prospective payment or annual budgetary system; (8) coverage for
formulary medications, monitored and approved via the computer
network; (9) inclusion of all workers' compensation needs; and (10)
allowing commercial insurance companies to significantly downsize and
continue to cover non-AHCT or elective services.
The authors declare that the goals of medicine can only be
accomplished after consensus is reached by investigating differences in
assumptions, and coming to an understanding by recognizing the
validity of others' perspectives. How can the "Quincy Model" achieve
these goals when presented from one narrow perspective?
Michael Boggst

1 Dr. van der Reis is Director of the Quincy Foundation for Medical Research
Charitable Trust.
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